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USSR: First Steps After Brezhnev

The Soviet leadership's handling of Brezhnev's funeral arrangements reflects the regime's determination to make the succession appear orderly and suggests that Andropov is a strong candidate to succeed Brezhnev as party leader (see Special Analyses).

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The Soviet leadership moved quickly to announce a commission for Brezhnev's funeral on Monday, chaired by Andropov and including all of the key Moscow-based leaders. The session of the Supreme Soviet, previously scheduled to open this Tuesday, has been postponed until 23 November.

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The Central Committee may meet today. There have been no indications of unusual military activity.

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Comment: The Soviet leadership frequently designates the man intended to replace a deceased Soviet leader as head of his funeral commission. Defense Minister Ustinov, for example, headed Defense Minister Grechko's commission in 1976. None of the members of the triumvirate briefly ascendant after Stalin's death headed the commission for his funeral, but the man who did, Khrushchev, soon emerged as the new party leader.

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The leadership may have postponed the Supreme Soviet session to reconsider resource decisions before the session's review of current economic goals. Brezhnev's heirs also may have felt that a session so soon after Brezhnev's departure would be unseemly.

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The Central Committee will probably meet soon to consider succession. Because the committee must ratify the Politburo's selection of the new General Secretary, delay in convening the plenum would indicate contention within the Politburo over the allocation of the posts.

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The Soviets are taking pains to give an appearance of business as usual. The lack of indications of heightened military readiness or unusual military presence in Moscow indicates that the succession will proceed without force, and the tone of the Brezhnev obituary suggests a desire for an image of continuity. Soviet officials have told US Embassy officials they want to go ahead with several bilateral meetings scheduled to take place in Moscow in the near future.

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WESTERN EUROPE: Socialists Discuss Security Issues

//Socialists and Social Democrats from the Benelux countries, Norway, and Denmark may be moving toward agreement that INF deployment should be postponed pending further assessment of the arms control situation.//

//After a meeting of the parties in Amsterdam last weekend, a spokesman of the Dutch Labor Party criticized the US for not allowing French and British nuclear forces and US aircraft to be included in the INF arms control talks between the US and the USSR. The parties will try to agree early in 1983 on a common platform on security issues. The West German Social Democrats, who normally attend these meetings only as observers, reportedly will host the next meeting in January.//

//In the past, the Norwegian and Danish parties have kept the group from taking specifically anti-INF positions. Although the Scandinavians have not yet repudiated NATO's two-track INF decision supporting deployment and negotiations simultaneously, they have shown increasing uneasiness about the possibility of deployment.//

Comment: //All the parties apparently hope to persuade the US to make a new offer at Geneva. They may have also begun to think more seriously about what to do if an INF arms control agreement is not reached soon. Now that none of the parties has government responsibilities, they may eventually call for postponement of INF deployments.//

//If pressed by Belgian and Dutch representatives, who have opposed accepting the missiles, the Scandinavians could support postponing deployment. They might claim that further reassessments of the arms control situation are called for under NATO's INF decision.//

//The offer by the West German Social Democrats to host the next meeting may help to broaden the forum to include parties from large NATO countries. The West Germans in the past have advised the other parties against anti-INF positions, and recent statements indicate no lapse in their support for the NATO policy. As members of the group, however, they would have ready-made international support if they decided to criticize the Kohl government's policy on INF or to qualify further their own support for deployment.//

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POLAND: Government Announces Walesa's Release

The announcement yesterday of Walesa's impending release reflects increased regime self-confidence following Solidarity's failure to mount any significant strikes on Wednesday and increases the chances that martial law formally will be lifted before the end of the year.

A Polish press spokesman told Western correspondents that Walesa no longer poses a threat to Poland's internal stability. The government also released a letter Walesa sent to Premier Jaruzelski on Monday in which the former leader of Solidarity said it is time "for accord" and proposed the two meet to discuss "subjects of mutual interest."

Walesa's wife privately expressed concern to Western correspondents about her husband's health--including her suspicion that he had been drugged. She also said that "Leszek and I want to leave Poland."

Solidarity's call for strikes on Wednesday went largely unheeded. Workers said that regime pressure had been too great. Demonstrations on Wednesday were smaller than those in August or May.

More demonstrations in Warsaw yesterday were somewhat larger but were easily controlled. The press spokesman said that the failure of the strike call paves the way for the lifting of martial law by the end of the year.

Comment: The regime's decision to release Walesa seems an effort to capitalize on its victory on Wednesday by showing that it is no longer afraid of the former Solidarity leader. Jaruzelski is probably willing to meet with Walesa hoping that such a meeting would erode the union leader's credibility. The authorities might also calculate that Walesa would prove receptive to Jaruzelski's overtures because he would not have his advisers present--something he has previously demanded.

The authorities realize that Walesa remains a serious threat and undoubtedly have set stiff conditions regarding his activities. He clearly will not be a free man as long as he remains in Poland. The regime obviously would like him to emigrate and may already have extracted a promise from his wife.

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LEBANON: Feuding Threatens Jumayyil's Credibility

Intermittent fighting in the Shuf mountain area east of Beirut between Christian and Muslim militias could seriously damage President Jumayyil's standing.

Despite the truce declared last Friday, clashes continue almost daily. A Druze attack on a Christian funeral procession on Monday killed 15 people and intensified the enmity between the two communities.

Jumayyil has chaired several meetings with the antagonists and local political chiefs in an effort to halt the feuding. The refusal of Phalange militia commander Fadi Frem to attend last Tuesday's meeting and his decision to boycott future meetings are seen by many as an indication of the militia's determination to pursue the fight.

Comment: The fighting in the Shuf is Jumayyil's first political test beyond the confines of Beirut. Political leaders have called on him to deploy the Lebanese Army there, but Jumayyil has sidestepped the issue by claiming that Israeli refusal to withdraw has blocked these efforts.

The Lebanese President probably fears the Army is not strong enough to confront the local militias. Nevertheless, his need to assert his authority may now make him more inclined to seek Israeli withdrawal and deploy the Army.

The willingness of the political leaders of both communities to avoid recriminations since Tuesday's meeting suggests that Jumayyil's mediation effort still has a chance of easing tensions. It is doubtful, however, that the militia leaders are prepared to cooperate now.

If the talks fail and fighting intensifies, many will expect Jumayyil to use the extraordinary governing powers given to him by the National Assembly on Tuesday to restore order. His credibility will be badly damaged if he is unwilling to use his sweeping powers and exert government authority in an area just 24 kilometers from Beirut.

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TURKEY: Referendum Results

The overwhelming "yes" vote in last Sunday's constitutional referendum is an indication of broad popular approval of the military regime and of President Evren in particular. [redacted]

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Official returns indicate a 90-percent voter turnout and a 91.5-percent approval rate for the constitution. The constituent assembly, which has been acting as a legislative body since its formation a year ago, already is at work on legislation that would pave the way for the resumption of political activity early next year. [redacted]

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Comment: The vote almost certainly reflected Evren's enormous popularity rather than support for the constitution. The ruling generals probably see the outcome as a vindication of the regime's policies to bring order and stability to Turkey. They may also see it as a mandate to play a more active role behind the scenes in shaping and fostering a new generation of political leaders. [redacted]

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While most Turks probably will continue to support efforts to maintain peace and order, they are likely gradually to assert their political views more actively. If broader political activity eventually were to undermine the stability achieved over the past two years, the military probably would intervene again. [redacted]

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Evren and the ruling council are likely to point to the vote as proof of their commitment to the restoration of democracy, hoping to undercut any further attempts to oust Turkey from West European regional organizations. The generals are likely to continue their pro-Western policies, but they will also continue to refrain from any action that might jeopardize Ankara's ties with its Islamic neighbors. [redacted]

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BRAZIL: A Political Test

//The military-backed government appears likely to suffer some setbacks in national elections on Monday, but these probably will not reverse the political liberalization process.// [redacted]

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//Almost all major offices except the presidency are at stake in the country's most important election since the military took power in 1964. Congressional and state results will ultimately determine the composition of the electoral college that will choose President Figueiredo's successor in 1985.// [redacted]

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//Preelection polls suggest that a majority of voters are mainly dissatisfied with the state of the economy. The US Embassy opinion polls and other sources indicate the combined opposition for the first time is likely to win a majority in the lower house of Congress as well as a significant number of governorships in key states like Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.// [redacted]

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Comment: //The strength of the progovernment Social Democratic Party's local organizations probably will offset some opposition sentiment, especially in rural areas. The government probably will retain control of the Senate and about half the gubernatorial posts and should win massively in a wide number of state legislative and local contests.// [redacted]

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//Administration leaders have apparently come to a grudging recognition, however, that earlier efforts to manipulate electoral rules will not assure retention of control over the longer term. If, as expected, the government ends up with about 43 percent of the vote, its control of the 1985 presidential election could be in jeopardy. The major opposition party will get about an equal share of the vote.// [redacted]

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NATO: Problems With Greece

//Apex 82, the monthlong NATO field exercise scheduled to begin this week, has been canceled because of Greece's refusal to participate unless the island of Lemnos were included. At a NATO meeting on Monday almost all Allies joined the US in criticizing the Greek position, citing the financial costs, lost training opportunities, and setback to the deterrent credibility of NATO's quick reaction forces. The Turkish representatives charged the Greek Socialist government's view of the threat to NATO was not compatible with that of other Alliance members. Other Allies want NATO to avoid involvement in territorial disputes between members, and the Alliance plans to study the reasons for Greece's eleventh-hour refusal.// [redacted]

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USSR: Harassment of Sakharov

The wife of dissident Andrey Sakharov has told the US Embassy that on 4 November Sakharov was officially warned that he is in violation of the "regimen . . . established for him." No statement or decree establishing the conditions of his exile was ever issued. Last month he was robbed of a manuscript and some personal papers--presumably by the KGB--and believes that a narcotic may have been used on him. His wife now fears his life is in danger. [redacted]

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Comment: This increased harassment is consistent with the crackdown on dissent begun last spring, apparently aimed at dissidents' communications with the outside world. The official warning could serve as a basis for prosecution, although heretofore Sakharov's standing in the West has afforded him a degree of protection. Imprisonment or exile from the USSR probably would follow such prosecution. We believe the Soviets are not likely to arrange his "accidental" death. [redacted]

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
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CHINA-USSR: Negotiation Topics

[redacted] the US Embassy in Beijing reports that during the Sino-Soviet talks last month the Chinese proposed a five-phase plan for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. The two sides discussed the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia in return for a Chinese pledge of nonaggression toward Mongolia. The Soviets reportedly agreed to consider discussing the latter point with the Mongolians.// [redacted]

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Comment: //The Chinese probably calculate that their proposals on these issues will create discord between Moscow and its two Asian clients. Although the USSR publicly reiterated after the talks that relations with China will not be improved "to the detriment" of other countries, it may be willing to consider border disengagement schemes that include Mongolia. Moscow may temper its support for Vietnam, but a recent *Pravda* article strongly attacking the Chinese position on Kampuchea indicates that the USSR is unlikely to negotiate with China on this issue.// [redacted]

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Special Analysis

USSR: After Brezhnev

President Brezhnev's death at age 75 after 18 years as head of the Soviet party and five as head of state has significant implications for Soviet policy. He wielded less personal power than any of his predecessors, but at least until recently, he was the regime's pivotal figure, the primary architect of policy, and the chief arbiter of differences within the Politburo. Brezhnev's departure will evoke little emotional response from the largely apolitical Soviet population. The leadership will move rapidly to name his immediate replacement as party leader, but his demise will accelerate policy debate already under way in the Kremlin. Brezhnev's chief legacy is an ambitious program of military spending that helped the USSR attain unprecedented power and influence both in absolute terms and relative to the US, but which is increasingly difficult for the economy to support. [redacted]

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In the immediate aftermath of Brezhnev's death, collective restraints on his successor's power will inhibit the new leader's ability to deal forcefully with the critical economic situation. Soviet policy across the board will be less predictable. The resolution of leadership debate over many issues, however, may await the outcome of the power struggle, which could be prolonged. As a new leader consolidates his position, prospects of significant policy changes will increase. [redacted]

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Economic and Social Problems

Brezhnev's death comes at a time when Soviet economic prospects are gloomier than at any time since Stalin died in 1952. Since the mid-1970s, economic stringencies have increased, and GNP is currently growing at its lowest rate since World War II. This slowdown has called into question Brezhnev's economic strategy. [redacted]

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Brezhnev sought to ensure popular quiescence by providing incremental improvements in material well-being, while dealing harshly with dissidents among the intelligentsia and with the national minorities. The slowing

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of economic growth, however, by making it difficult to continue to raise living standards, has increased dissatisfaction in Soviet society. This mood manifests itself in such ways as the growing consumption of alcohol and has contributed to a sharp decline in the growth of labor productivity. [redacted]

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Despite the pressing need for new approaches to ameliorate economic problems, however, the very complexity of these issues will make it difficult for the post-Brezhnev leadership to unite on a new approach. Moreover, the lack of slack in the economy reduces the leadership's leeway in dealing with the most distressed sectors. Any significant reorientation of economic priorities would involve painful trade-offs between investment, military spending, and consumption. [redacted]

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Limitations on the Successor's Power

Brezhnev's replacement will have less power than any previous party leader to push through his own programs, at least initially. Brezhnev's era represented an informal institutionalization of decisionmaking processes that put limits on the party leader's freedom of action. Moreover, the new party leader will not inherit even the full measure of Brezhnev's power. [redacted]

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In previous successions, the Politburo did not readily submit to the successor's attempts to assume his predecessor's full authority. None of the contenders for Brezhnev's job has had the range of experience that would give him a persuasive claim to succeed on the strength of credentials and political following. In these circumstances, the new party head will almost certainly be denied the state presidency, and other actions to dilute his authority are possible. [redacted]

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Prospects for Policy Change

How different leaders will line up in forthcoming policy debates cannot be foreseen with any confidence, because opportunism is likely to prevail over any desire for consistency. As they maneuver for political advantage and attempt to win allies, Politburo members will not necessarily refrain from attacking policies they previously

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supported. Brezhnev himself may not escape the fate that befell Stalin, Khrushchev, and most other former heads of Communist regimes and may be blamed posthumously for the policy shortcomings of his incumbency. [redacted]

It is improbable that the post-Brezhnev regime will scale down its foreign policy ambitions significantly in the near term because of internal problems. Increased debt and long-term hard currency shortages could affect the level of Moscow's economic commitments to client regimes in the Third World and could make Moscow more reluctant to take on major new economic burdens like those it has in Cuba or Angola. [redacted]

The military will probably retain its effective veto over many aspects of national security policy. During Brezhnev's tenure, the military's prestige and influence expanded along with the expansion of the country's international role, as was made manifest in the elevation of the Defense Minister to full membership on the Politburo in 1973. In addition, the military hierarchy's weight in policy deliberations has traditionally been especially strong during succession periods. [redacted]

Brezhnev's address to the military last week suggested that economic investment priorities have been a subject of recent debate. This subject was certain to be a primary issue at the Central Committee Plenum scheduled for next week, and it is a subject that a new leadership cannot escape. In the short term, however, new decisions on investment levels are not going to cause significant changes in living standards or economic performance. [redacted]

Significant reforms, however, could well emerge in particular areas. Some economic reforms would be compatible with conservative social and political policies. In any event, although the precedent may not prevail, in previous successions the contender with the more "conservative" program has triumphed over the candidate advocating more "liberal" policies. [redacted]

In the past, once the successor has secured his position, he has modified his program in a "liberal" direction substantially. Thus, Khrushchev adopted much of Malenkov's program--which concentrated on consumer goods, cut the military budget, and opened a dialogue with the US. Brezhnev, after establishing his authority, took over former Premier Kosygin's championship of detente with the US and his greater attention to consumer problems. [redacted]

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Special Analysis

USSR: Room at the Top

Although it is too early to tell who the ultimate winners will be, the announcement that Andropov is the chairman of the Brezhnev funeral commission strongly suggests he will become the General Secretary. [redacted]

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Andropov's policy inclinations are not clear. On the one hand, there are hints that he may favor some reform of the current system of economic planning and management. His public statements have indicated that he has supported Brezhnev's policies aimed at minimizing the possibility of confrontation with the US and reaching an arms control agreement, while expanding Moscow's influence in the Third World and Soviet military power. [redacted]

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On the other hand, he played an important role in the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and, as head of the KGB, has emphasized the need for internal discipline and has directed the effort to suppress the dissident movement. His public statements suggest that he would not countenance foreign influence on what he perceived as a purely internal Soviet matter, such as Jewish emigration. [redacted]

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There is also some evidence that he probably would continue to offer strong support for countries such as Angola and Afghanistan that are believed to be "moving toward 'socialism'." [redacted]

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A Weaker General Secretary

Whoever the new leader is--and Chernenko still has a chance--his ability to influence Soviet policy will be inhibited by a decisionmaking process that will become more "collective" in the immediate aftermath of Brezhnev's departure. The new leader's colleagues, acting in their own political interests, will probably move to prevent him from becoming Chief of State--a post Brezhnev did not acquire until after 13 years as General Secretary.

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There may also be some question as to whether the General Secretary will also be Chairman of the Defense Council. [redacted]

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As in the early days of the Brezhnev era, the General Secretary probably will share the spotlight, particularly in foreign affairs. At the outset at least, Western leaders could be dealing more with the Foreign Minister, Premier, or President, rather than with the new General Secretary. [redacted]

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Filling Key Vacancies

The selection of a new president and a replacement for party Secretary Kirilenko, who evidently has been moved aside, will be a good indicator of the General Secretary's relative strength. So, too, will be the men who are picked to fill the other key positions that will be opened by Brezhnev's and Kirilenko's departures. If the General Secretary can fill these positions with individuals loyal to him, then the period required for him to consolidate his power could be a good deal shorter than the three to five years it has taken in the past. [redacted]

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